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In the 1983 movie War Games, the leading character is a young 
hacker who unwittingly accesses a United States military supercomputer 
programmed to predict the possible outcomes of nuclear war, and then 
proceeds to start his favourite game: Global Thermonuclear War. What 
we know, but the computer geek does not, is that the US military, hop-
ing to eliminate the unpredictable ‘human element’ in the event of an 
actual war, has given the computer total control over the launching of 
nuclear warheads. The film describes the protagonist’s race against time 
to reverse the computer’s resolve to start World War III. What was 
considered science fiction some 30 years back – the possibility of being 
able to hack into a military computer system to start an armed conflict - 
has now become a realistic scenario. 
The military use of cyberspace is not a hypothetical possibility any-
more, but rather an existing fact. Several states have already included 
cyber warfare in their military doctrine and established specific units 
that are designed to engage in cyber hostilities. In a recent  study by the 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), more 
than 30 states are described as having adopted specific measures to in-
clude cyber warfare in their military plans and structures.1 Such a trend 
is surely destined to increase, as are the technological developments in 
* Assistant Professor of International Law, Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna. 
1 See Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘Cybersecurity and 
Cyberwarfare – Preliminary Assessment of National Doctrine and Organization’ 
(UNIDIR, 2011) available at: <http://unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cybersecurity-and-
cyberwarfare-preliminary-assessment-of-national-doctrine-and-organization-380.pdf>. 
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the area of information technology and the reliance of states and private 
actors on computer networks. Cyberspace has effectively become a new 
domain, which offers huge benefits to everyone who is able to exploit it, 
but whose pervasive influence on our lives also turns it into a significant 
source of threats and vulnerabilities.  
When such threats may degenerate into an armed conflict, the exer-
cise for international lawyers becomes that of assessing whether the ex-
isting legal framework – developed at a time when the cyber domain did 
not yet exist and was presumably not even thought of – offers adequate 
rules to protect states and individuals from the menaces of cyber war-
fare. 
This is the task that Marco Roscini takes on in his book Cyber Oper-
ations and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2014), where he surveys the laws governing the resort to force 
and the conduct of hostilities as they relate to computer network attacks 
(CNAs), with the aim ‘to provide a systematic and coherent analysis of 
the international law applicable to military cyber operations’.2 Given the 
pivotal importance the topic has assumed in contemporary legal debate, 
it comes as no surprise that a significant number of books and studies 
have already dealt with it.3 This, on one hand, has prevented the author 
from breaking new ground on at least some of the matters covered in 
the book as they had already been explored in existing literature. On 
the other hand, Roscini makes excellent use of the wealth of scholarly 
material available, also reviewing contributions in languages other than 
2 M Roscini, Cyber Operations and the Use of Force in International Law (OUP, 
2014) 42. 
3 Important contributions include H Dinniss, Cyber Warfare and the Laws of War 
(CUP, 2012) and, more recently, Y Radziwill, Cyber-Attacks and the Exploitable 
Imperfections of International Law (Brill, 2015). Also notable are the collections of 
essays edited by MN Schmitt in the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable 
to Cyber Warfare (CUP, 2013) and by N Tsagourias and R Buchan in their recent 
Research Handbook on International Law and Cyberspace (Edward Elgar, 2015). The 
same two authors had already edited a special issue of the Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law (vol 19, 2012) entirely devoted to the application of jus ad bellum/jus in 
bello to cyber war. A special edition of the Air Force Law Review (vol 64, 2009) has also 
grappled with the same topic, as has the special issue of the Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights (vol 43, 2013), edited by Y Dinstein and F Domb. The individual contributions 
on various aspects of cyber warfare that feature in international journals and reviews are 
almost countless. 
 
 
Applying the ius in bello in the cyber domain                                                            15 
 
English, and providing balanced and often innovative solutions in 
adapting traditional international law rules to the new cyber realm.  
The book is composed of five chapters, preceded by a foreword by 
Yoram Dinstein. Chapter 1 sets the stage for the subsequent legal analy-
sis. It provides an account of the threat that cyber operations pose to 
international security, as well as an introduction to computer terminol-
ogy. Roscini is able to illustrate technicalities in a language that non-
specialists will understand, without however oversimplifying the rele-
vant concepts. Most importantly, he explains his contention that ‘exist-
ing treaty and customary norms can be extended to cyber operations by 
means of interpretation even though the relevant treaties and custom do 
not expressly contemplate them’.4 His argument is convincingly based 
on state practice, ie on the fact that most states clearly consider cyber-
attacks as being potential threats to international peace and security, 
and – at least when they occur in the framework of an ongoing armed 
conflict – as subjected to the regulatory regime of International Human-
itarian Law (IHL).  The author also sets aside the argument that the law 
should not be applied to CNAs because the Geneva Conventions were 
drafted significantly before the technology to launch such attacks was 
available. According to Roscini,5 the forward-looking disposition of 
IHL can be clearly inferred from the inclusion of the so-called Martens 
Clause in all major jus in bello treaties, which states that, in the presence 
of legal gaps, ‘civilians and combatants remain under the protection and 
authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public 
conscience’.6 In addition, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I  (AP I) re-
quires states to review new weapons, means and methods of warfare for 
compatibility with the Protocol and with other rules of international law 
applicable to the parties to the treaty. Hence, if one accepts that cyber 
operations do constitute a means and methods of combat, it flows that 
4 Roscini (n 2) 19. 
5 ibid 22, 29. 
6 Art 1(2), Additional  Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977) 1125 
UNTS 3. 
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the laws of armed conflict are applicable to CNAs, despite the fact that 
their technology is new.7 
Chapter 2 of the book deals with the applicability of contemporary 
jus ad bellum to CNAs, while Chapters 3 and 4 deal respectively with 
the applicability of IHL to cyber operations and with the way in which 
its rules can be adapted to respond to the challenges of such modern 
methods of warfare. The fifth and final Chapter considers the obliga-
tions of neutral and belligerent states under the law of neutrality in the 
cyber domain. The present piece briefly looks at some of the arguments 
Roscini puts forward when he assesses whether and how the jus in bello 
is able to effectively regulate cyber attacks.    
The starting point for his analysis is that the special characteristics 
of cyber weapons raise some new ethical and legal problems, which 
prompt questions on whether existing rules are sufficiently accurate to 
handle the unprecedented challenges raised by cyber operations. Is it 
enough to reinterpret established legal tenets in a progressive and teleo-
logical fashion? Or is there perhaps a need for a new standard-setting 
exercise to regulate at least certain aspects of cyber warfare? Roscini 
clearly supports the first option, and the book abounds with examples 
where evolutive interpretations of IHL provisions are convincingly put 
forward. According to the author, international law is ‘well equipped to 
face [the] challenges posed by cyber warfare’. 8 
While many of his conclusions are to be welcomed as they appear to 
strike a fair balance between state interests and the obligation to safe-
guard civilians and civilian objects, it should not be forgotten that in-
ternational law offers specific directions when it comes to treaty inter-
pretation. It is true that the general rules included in the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties recognize subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice of the parties as important means of interpretation 
(Vienna Convention, Article 31(3) (a) and (b)). Yet a difference must be 
traced between subsequent practice in the application of a treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation and 
7 See also the famous passage of the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, where 
the International Court of Justice held that the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocols apply ‘to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, 
those of the present and those of the future’: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons (Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996) [1996] ICJ Rep, para 86. 
8 Roscini (n 2) 280. 
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other subsequent practice which does not necessarily reflect an agree-
ment on interpretation.9 The latter might still be relevant in determining 
the meaning to be given to specific treaty language, yet it is not as con-
clusive as the former when it comes to interpreting a treaty in an evolu-
tive way. This is even more the case if one considers the high number of 
state parties to the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, as 
it might be difficult to assess the practice of numerous states, deciding 
how to appraise any inconsistencies in that practice, how to interpret 
any silence or inaction, and how to define which types of practice are 
relevant, especially considering the secretive nature of cyber opera-
tions.10 Therefore, one is left to wonder if the practice referred to in 
Roscini’s book is in all cases quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient to 
substantiate novel interpretations of IHL treaties, or rather should be 
used to support the idea that customary rules are crystallizing in certain 
areas.   
Roscini himself appears to leave the door open to the development 
of new general rules pertaining to CNAs, as ‘it cannot be excluded that 
customary international law rules specific to cyber warfare might be in 
the process of forming and eventually ripen’. 11 Yet even in this respect, 
caution is warranted. Because of the secrecy that still surrounds state 
conduct in the cyber domain and the inherent difficulties in attributing 
responsibility for cyber attacks, publicly available and legally relevant 
state practice remains scarce. The author in fact readily accepts that 
times may be premature to identify fully fledged customary rules per-
taining to CNAs, and looks at military manuals and policy documents as 
indicators of ‘trends of the direction towards which customary interna-
tional law is starting to develop in this area’.12 
In Chapter 3, the book offers a very convincing analysis of how IHL 
applies to cyber operations, whether conducted in isolation or in the 
9 See G Nolte, ‘First report on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in 
relation to treaty interpretation’ UN Doc A/CN.4/660 (19 march 2013) 29.  
10 See SD Murphy, ‘The Relevance of Subsequent Agreement and Subsequent 
Practice for the  Interpretation of Treaties’, in G Nolte (ed), Treaties and Subsequent 
Practice (OUP, 2013) 92-93. 
11 Roscini (n 2) 25. 
12  ibid 30. For a first attempt to look at relevant state practice see T Keber and NR 
Przemyslaw, ‘Ius ad bellum electronicum? Cyberangriffe im Lichte der UN-Charta und 
aktueller Staatenpraxis’ (2011) 49 Archiv des Völkerrechts 399. 
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framework of an ongoing traditional armed conflict. Different sections 
are devoted to international armed conflicts (including situations of bel-
ligerent occupation), to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), and 
to situations of internal disturbances, that do not amount to an armed 
conflict and fall within the scope of domestic law and international hu-
man rights law. One aspect on which perhaps some further analysis by 
legal scholars would be warranted concerns the features that an armed 
confrontation needs to possess in order to be qualified as a NIAC.  
Roscini sets out from the definition developed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber 
in the Tadić decision, which defines a NIAC as ‘protracted armed vio-
lence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State’.13 When assessing the level of or-
ganization required, the author reviews the case of a private firm that 
conducts cyber-attacks for financial gain, concluding that – in the pres-
ence of the required level of organization – its motivations are ‘irrele-
vant’ for the qualification of conflict. 14 This assumption is, in effect, not 
uncontroversial. While it is true that the qualification as an organized 
armed group is based on objective criteria so as to avoid giving promi-
nence to subjective factors such as the group’s motivation, the law is not 
completely ‘blind’ in that respect. The ICTY maintains that such enti-
ties should be characterized by  
 
‘the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and 
mechanisms within the group; the existence of a headquarters; the fact 
that the group controls a certain territory; the ability of the group to 
gain access to weapons, other military equipment, recruits and military 
training; its ability to plan, coordinate and carry out military opera-
tions, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to define a 
unified military strategy and use military tactics; and its ability to speak 
with one voice and negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-
fire or peace accords.’15 
 
13 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeals on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) para 70 (emphasis added). 
14 Roscini (n 2) 156. 
15 ICTY, Prosecutor v Haradinaj et al (Judgement, Trial Chamber) IT–04–84 (3 
April 2008) para 60. 
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By requiring an objectively verifiable military strategy or capacity to 
carry out military operations, the definition appears to exclude entities 
that rely exclusively on terrorist or other perfidious methods, whose 
main activity is to assert their egoistic interests through an arbitrary use 
of violence.16 Indeed, states do not seem to be at all keen to categorize 
clashes with militarily organized criminal groups as NIACs.17 One 
would imagine that such an attitude would persist even vis-à-vis a group 
of hackers, although it is recognized that cyber-gangs can cause exten-
sive damage to civilians and civilian infrastructure while pursuing their 
criminal aims. More generally, while it is true that these indicators ‘are 
not binding, not exhaustive and not cumulative, and none of them is 
more important than the others’,18 it is also rather clear that the list was 
drawn with kinetic attacks in mind. Hence, non-state actors fighting the 
incumbent government by exclusively carrying out cyber attacks would 
probably face problems in being acknowledged as sufficiently organized 
for the purposes of triggering the application of IHL.   
Chapter 4 focuses on a series of important legal issues connected to 
the use of cyber technology in military operations. Questions under re-
view include the legality of cyber weapons as such; the notion of direct 
participation in hostilities in the cyber domain; the application of the 
rules on targeting to CNAs (including the ones defining the proportion-
ality of an attack); how cyber operations not resulting in loss of life or 
injury to persons (and hence not amounting to ‘attacks’) are regulated 
by IHL; and what the law says about undertaking cyber attacks as bel-
ligerent reprisals.  
One of the most debated issues, of course, concerns the application 
of the principle of proportionality in cyber attacks, ie the balancing be-
tween the concrete and direct military advantage that is anticipated 
from the attack and the expected loss of civilian life and damage to ci-
16 See P Hauck, S Peterke, ‘Organized Crime and Gang Violence in National and 
International Law’ (2010) 92 Intl Rev Red Cross 407, 433. Emily Crawford, for instance, 
submits that ‘for policy reasons, in the case of organized crime groups, the motives of 
the parties should be taken into consideration if IHL is to be the lex specialis’: E 
Crawford, Identifying the Enemy: Civilian Participation in Armed Conflict (OUP, 2015) 
186. 
17 C Bergal, ‘The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-International Armed 
Conflict Classification’ (2011) 34 Fordham Intl L J 1042, 1076-80. 
18 Roscini (n 2) 155. 
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vilian property that might be caused. Roscini introduces a useful con-
ceptualisation of the effects of cyber attacks, 19 dividing them into pri-
mary effects (those on the attacked computer, computer system or net-
work), secondary effects (those on the infrastructure operated by the 
attacked system or network), and tertiary effects (those on the persons 
affected by the destruction or incapacitation of the attacked system or 
infrastructure). This distinction is resorted to also in his description of 
the proportionality equation, where he stresses that all three types of ef-
fects must be taken into account in assessing the level of acceptable in-
cidental damage.20 The collateral damage that should be balanced 
against the military advantage is only the one that is expected, ie damage 
that is ‘a reasonably likely or foreseeable consequence of the operation 
on the basis of the information available at the time of the attack’.21 
However, in a context in which military and civilian networks are often 
interconnected, damage to civilian objects might be extremely difficult 
to predict. As Schmitt argues, ‘the problem of knock-on effects looms 
much larger in computer network attacks than in kinetic attacks owing 
to the interconnectivity of computers’.22 Due to the inherent features of 
cyber weapons, an attacking actor might not be able to regulate the 
amount of force applied and the cyber-strike might have a destructive 
effect on unintended targets. Thus, a higher degree of uncertainty seems 
to be intrinsic to CNAs, as the predictability of its end results heavily 
relies on the specific (often hard-to-obtain) knowledge of the target’s 
configuration at the moment of the attack. Roscini himself recognizes 
that – when called to assess and balance the expected incidental damage 
and the anticipated military advantage – the cyber context presents 
unique difficulties, which make any ex ante evaluation ‘an esoteric pre-
diction’.23 Yet he concludes that, by adopting precautions in the plan-
ning and launching of the attack as required by IHL, even cyber attacks 
can be brought in line with the principle of proportionality. Ironically, 
the first precautionary measure which Article 57 of AP I imposes on 
those who plan an attack is to verify that the objectives to be attacked 
19 ibid 52-53. 
20 ibid 220. 
21 ibid 221. 
22 MN Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello’ 
(2000) 84 Intl Rev Red Cross 365, 393. 
23 Roscini (n 2) 228. 
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are military objectives within the meaning of IHL. Given the fact that 
virtually the entire cyber infrastructure (computers, cables, satellites, 
etc.) is used for both civilian and military communications (ie all of 
these items are so-called dual-use objects) its classification as a ‘military 
objective’ might be an all-to-easy task.24 In a context in which much of a 
nation’s everyday activities rely on cyber infrastructure, it is not overly 
difficult for an enemy State to destroy all (or much of) it by arguing that 
such computers or servers are (also) used to transmit military communi-
cations. While the attacking party would still have to comply with the 
rules on proportionality, this scenario poses great concern for the pro-
tection of the civilian population.25 
At times, moreover, the attempt to adjust traditional jus in bello to 
the reality of cyber operations appears to considerably stretch the mean-
ing of its rules, suggesting that, while IHL remains applicable, it proba-
bly does not adapt perfectly to cyber attacks. The notion of levée en 
masse seems to well illustrate this point. 26 It is difficult to see how civil-
ians who conduct CNAs in response to a foreign invasion can obtain 
prisoner of war (POW) status in case of capture if – for this purpose – 
the law requires them to ‘carry arms openly’. Civilian laptops, servers or 
pieces of software do not necessarily fit the definition of arms envisaged 
by the drafters of IHL treaties.27 Therefore, participants in a cyber levée 
en masse would on one hand be considered as capable of launching at-
tacks as defined by AP I, but would in all likelihood fall short of the re-
quirements necessary to enjoy combatant privileges. The impression, 
thus, is that certain IHL provisions do not conform to the realities of 
24 This is even more the case since authoritative doctrine states that ‘status as a 
civilian object and military objective cannot coexist; an object is either one or the other’, 
and that even a limited military use of an otherwise civilian object turns it into a military 
objective, Tallinn Manual (n 3) 134. 
25 C Droege, ‘Get Off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian Law, 
and the Protection of Civilians’ (2012) 94 Intl Rev Red Cross 533, 564. 
26 Art 4.A.6 of the Third Geneva Convention defines levée en masse as a 
spontaneous uprising by ‘[i]nhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the 
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, 
without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they 
carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.’ All those falling under such 
definition are entitled to POW status if captured. 
27 The Tallinn Manual even notes that the ‘requirement to carry arms openly has 
little application in the cyber context’ (n 3) 100. 
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cyber warfare, which raises the question of whether an ad hoc treaty 
would assist in solving some of the outstanding legal conundrums.  
This is particularly true in the cyber domain when conventional 
IHL does not fully keep up with the protective aims it is meant to 
achieve.28 In the end, some important legal questions are better settled 
not by scholars but by the states that will themselves be governed by the 
solution. Even where traditional jus in bello does offer some guidelines, 
a distinct and more focused legal instrument would help in clarifying 
and strengthening the rules. Indeed, the presence of general norms out-
lawing the use of certain means of warfare has not prevented states form 
adopting specific treaties aimed at limiting, forbidding the use or pre-
venting the development of certain types of weapons.29 Clearly, such an 
exercise is all the more important if one considers the potential (intend-
ed but also unintended) effects of cyber attacks.30 Also, more legal pre-
cision would probably assist military and civilian personnel in planning 
and implementing operations in the cyber domain, and may somewhat 
alleviate their fear of the consequences of violating the law of armed 
conflict.31  
While the adoption of a new binding instrument would – in the pre-
sent author’s view – contribute to increase the level of legal protection 
bestowed on civilians and civilian objects, it needs to be recognized that 
it is currently a rather unlikely prospect given the difficulty of treaty 
promulgation in this area.32 This is why Roscini’s volume is all the more 
28 See DB Hollis, ‘Why States Need an International Law for Information 
Operations’ (2007) 11 Lewis and Clark L Rev 1023. 
29 For instance, the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction was adopted notwithstanding the fact that poisons had long been 
banned in customary international law, see D Brown, ‘A Proposal for an International 
Convention To Regulate the Use of Information Systems in Armed Conflict’ (2006) 47 
Harvard Intl L J 179, 183. 
30 In 2009, President Obama described computer network attacks as a ‘weapon of 
mass disruption’. The White House, ‘Remarks by the President on Securing our 
Nation’s Cyber infrastructure’ (Office of the Press Secretary, 29 May 2009) 
<www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-securing-our-nations-cyber-
infrastructure>. 
31 See Brown (n 27) ibid. 
32 For instance, in 2009, the Russian Federation unsuccessfully lobbied for a treaty 
‘to ban states from secretly embedding malicious codes or circuitry that could be later 
activated from a distance in the event of war’, see C Wilson, ‘Cyber Security and Cyber 
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a welcome addition to existing literature in the field. The way in which 
the author uses concrete cases of cyber operations as practical, real-
world examples of the types of attacks which have taken place – and his 
subsequent legal assessment – make this volume a much valued naviga-
tion tool, useful to appraise the current state of legal development in the 
area. The detail and breadth of information found in all of the chapters 
is remarkable, and the book will quickly become a required reading for 
anyone who wishes to contribute in a qualified manner to the debate on 
cyber warfare.   
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